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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
NORTH DAKOTA'S ANTI-CORPORATE FARMING ACT
T. P. McEuLoy*
By way of a sequel to Professor White's learned discourse at our
last meeting on the tax aspects of corporate farming, I have some
general thoughts I'd like to pass along to you with respect to North
Dakota's Corporate Farming Act. Like most of us here, my only
brush with that Act was a passing reference to it in law school,
but certain developments in the past year and a half have caused
me to take a long look at the act and at what courts have had to
say about it and somewhat similar laws.
My interest was awakened because of an action brought in the
summer of 1958 by the Attorney General's office in the name of
Grand Forks County against a corporate client of mine, which
action alleged a violation of our corporate farming act and prayed
for escheat of some 3,000 acres of Red River Valley farm land.
This particular act was given birth in the June primary of 1932
through an initiated measure approved by a vote of 114,496 to
85,932 and is now found in a slightly amended form as Chapter
10-06 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943. At the time of its
adoption by the people of this state North Dakota was at the bottom
of the great depression, and I believe it safe to say that the Act
was aimed in large measure at life insurance companies and out-
state corporate lenders which had foreclosed on thousands of acres
of North Dakota agricultural land.
In brief, the act as subsequently amended by the 1933 legislature
provides:
(1) All corporations, both foreign and domestic, except as other-
wise provided in this chapter, are prohibited from engaging in the
business of farming or agriculture.'
(2) All corporations ... shall dispose of rural real estate, except
such as is reasonably necessary in the conduct of their businesses,
on or before July 29, 1942.2
(3) All lands acquired by a corporation since July 29, 1932,
except . . . shall be disposed of within ten years after such acquisi-
tion.-
.Member of Degnan, Hager, McElroy & Lamb, Grand Forks, N.D. This is the 'text of
a discussion presented by the author at a meeting of the Grand Forks County Bar
Association.
1. N.D. Rev. Code § 10-0601 (1943).
2. Ibid, § 10-0602.
3. Ibid. § 10-0603.
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(4) Cooperative corporations are exempt from the act where
75 per cent of their members reside on farms or depend principally
on farming for their livelihood.
4
(5) In case any corporation fails to dispose of its rural lands
within the time fixed by this chapter, title thereto shall escheat to
the county on an action brought by the state's attorney. The lands
shall be sold at public auction, and proceeds therefrom, after ex-
penses, remitted to the corporation.'
North Dakota is not unique in possessing this type of statute.
Somewhat similar laws going back to the ancient mortmain statutes
of the thirteenth century are found in no less than seven other states
of the union. The mortmain acts, as will be recalled from common
law history, were the "dead-hand" statutes which prohibited religi-
ous bodies from indefinitely holding lands devised to them. Such
acts have uniformly been held constitutional as within a state's
power to determine its own public policy.
For instance, Kansas provides that a corporation may not be
formed for the purpose of engaging in the business of producing,
planting, raising, harvesting or threshing wheat, corn, barley, rye,
oats, or potatoes, or for milking cows.
6
Kentucky prohibits corporate holdings of reality, except such as
is proper and necessary for carrying on the corporation's legitimate
business affairs, for longer than five years under penalty of escheat.7
Minnesota prohibits a corporation with alien control from owning
over 90,000 square feet of land.8
Mississippi provides that no corporation may hold or cultivate
more than 12,500 acres for agricultural purposes.'
Missouri prohibits corporate holding of realty, except such as is
proper and necessary for carrying on its legitimate business affairs,
for longer than fifteen years. 10
Oklahoma provides that no corporation may own land outside
an incorporated city or village, except such as is necessary and
proper for carrying on the business for which the corporation was
formed.1
West Virginia provides that a corporation's charter must state
the number of acres of land to be held by it.
12
4. Ibid. § 10-0604.
5. Ibid. § 10-0606.
6. Kan. Rev. Stat. § 17-2701 (Supp. 1941).
7. Ky. Const., § 192.
8. Minn. Laws (1959) c. 495.
9. Miss. Code § 5329 (1957).
10. Mo. Const., Art. XI.
11. Okla. Laws § 18-1.20 (1951).
12. W.Va. Code § 930 (1955).
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What have the courts had to say about such laws as North
Dakota's Chapter 10-06 and the similar acts to which I have just
referred? More particularly, what does the "reasonably necessary"
exception Inean?
The particular statute with which we are here concerned pro-
vides:
"All corporations both domestic and foreign, which now own
or hold rural real estate . . . used or usable for farming or agri-
culture, except such as is reasonably necessary in the conduct of
their business, shall dispose of the same .... .13
Generally, in dealing with statutory enactments limiting corporate
powers or limiting the right of corporations to acquire real estate,
the word "necessary" has been given a reasonable construction and
not one which would hamper the reasonable exercise of its corp-
orate powers.' In Folk v. State Capital Savings & Loan Assn.,1"
the Court said: "When it comes to determining what is 'necessary'
for the conduct of the business and transaction of the affairs for
which a corporation has been chartered, it must, of course, be
understood that what is meant is a due and profitable transaction
of its lawful purposes; that the 'necessity' contemplated is a relative
one having reference to economy, convenience, efficiency and
success; and that some latitude is to be allowed to the discretion
of the corporation itself in deciding what, from time to time, is or
is not, in that sense, necessary."
However, we are not here limited to analogous cases giving
general rules of interpretation and definition to the words 'neces-
sary or reasonably necessary' for there are other cases practically
in point. It has been held as a matter of law that property owned
by a corporation organized for the specific purpose "to buy, sell
and lease lands" is necessary for its business and not subject to a
constitutional provision prohibiting corporations from owning lands
for more than a specific period "except such as may be necessary
and proper for the carrying on of its legitimate business.' 6"
There are several unchallenged decisions from North Dakota
courts on the point, the first being Asbury Hospital v. Cass
13. N.D. Rev. Code § 10-0602 (1943).
14. J. L. Young Co. v. Minchew, 42 Ga. App. 228, 155 S.E. 356 (1930); Folk v.
State Capital Savings & Loan Ass'n., 214 Pa. 529, 63 At]. 1013 1013 (1906).
15. 214 Pa. 529, 63 Atl. 1013, 1016 (1906).
16. Folk v. State Capital Savings & Loan Ass'n, 214 Pa. 529, 63 AtL. 1013 (1906);
Commonwealth v. Louisville Property Co., 139 Ky. 689, 121 S.W. 399 (1909); Cree v.
Associates Co., 192 Ky. 669, 234 S.W. 288 (1921); Sylvester Watts Smyth Realty Co.
v. American Surety Co., 292 Mo. 423, 238 S.W. 494 (1921); Market Street Ry. Co. v.
Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. 225 (1895).
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County,17 wherein the Supreme Court said that: "When the statute
provides that ther.e shall be excepted from its operations such real
estate 'that is reasonably necessary in the conduct of' the business
of the corporation, it means such real estate as is reasonably nec-
essary for carrying on the business or activity which the corporation
was created to carry on." (emphasis supplied).
I think most lawyers of the state have long felt that the Asbury
case unqualifiedly upheld an absolute ban on corporate ownership
of rural lands in North Dakota. The decision did uphold the con-
stitutionality of the law, and did say, in effect, that Asbury Hospital
had no right to hold a quarter section of land in Cass County. But
Asbury was chartered as a hospital and nothing in its purpose clause
gave it power to own, hold or manage real estate of any kind. Its
sole right to hold any land, including that whereon its hospital
stood, was derived from the general powers given non-profit corp-
orations under the laws of the state of Minnesota, and it was in no
position to say that owning rural realty was reasonably necessary
to the operation of a hospital.
Several years after the Asbury case the North Dakota Supreme
Court handed down its only other decision to date involving the
corporate farming act. This second case 9 was a quiet title action
wherein the defendants contended plaintiff corporation was pro-
hibited from taking title to the land in question by Chapter 10-06.
The Supreme Court disposed of this contention by saying: "A
corporation may acquire and hold indefinitely real estate that is
otherwise within the prohibited category if it is reasonably necessary
in the conduct of its business."
20
Following the Asbury case, two actions for declaratory judgment
were brought by foreign corporations licensed to do business in
this state seeking a determination as to the status of farm lands
owned by such corporations under the Act here involved. In an
action entitled Baldwin Corporation v. Dickey County,2 decided
October 26, 1942, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District
in and for Dickey County, the trial court there found that the
plaintiff was incorporated "To acquire by purchase or otherwise,
own, hold, buy, sell, convey, lease, mortgage or encumber, and
generally deal in real estate or property, - and to do and perform
all things needful and lawful for the development of the same for
17. 72 N.D. 359, 7 N.W.2d 438 (1943).
18. 72 N.D. at 375, 7 N.W.2d at 447.
19. Loy v. Kessler, 76 N.D. 738, 39 N.W.2d 260 (1949).
20. 76 N.D. at 760-61, 39 N.W.2d at 272.
21. Unreported.
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agriculture, residence, trade and business ...... The court further
found that since 1917 plaintiff had been actively engaged in the
business of buying, selling, leasing, managing, developing and
otherwise dealing in land within the state, and that it was not
engaged in the business of farming in the state.
Following its findings, the court concluded as a matter of law
that "the right to acquire by purchase or otherwise, own, hold, buy,
sell, convey, lease, mortgage or encumber, and generally deal in
real estate or property is essential to the business in which the
plaintiff is engaged, and all lands so acquired by the plaintiff are
reasonably necessary to the conduct of its business within the
meaning of (the Act)." Judgment was thereupon ordered per-
petually enjoining the enforcement of the Anti-Corporate Farming
Act against plaintiff.
The sole remaining case of which we are aware is Northwestern
Improvement Co. v. Morton County,2 ' decided February 24, 1942,
in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in Morton County.
In this case, likewise seeking a Declaratory Judgment, the trial
court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff was chartered "to purchase
or in any wise acquire for investment or for sale or otherwise, lands,
contracts for the purchase or sale of lands, buildings, improvements
and any other real property . . . and to manage, improve, develop
and turn to account any lands or contracts ......
The court further found that since 1897 plaintiff had been
actively engaged in the business of buying, selling, leasing, man-
aging, and otherwise dealing in land within the state, and that it
had never engaged in the business of farming and disclaimed any
intention of engaging in farming in North Dakota. As a conclusion
of law the court then held that the Act was not applicable to plain-
tiff, and that it was entitled to a permanent injunction restraining
enforcement of the Act against it.
It should be noted no appeal was taken in either the Baldwin or
Northwestern cases. We would also cite 19 C.J.S. 640, where it is
said: "Where the constitution or statutes so provide, a corporation
may not own or hold for more than a prescribed period real estate
not necessary or proper for its legitimate business. Such a pro-
hibition does not prevent a corporation from holding indefinitely
what is necessary or incidental to its business, or from acquiring
and holding in good faith beyond the prescribed period for neces-
sary future use. Where a corporation abandons its purpose to use
22. Unreported.
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the property for its business, the time within which it must dispose
thereof begins to run on such abandonment ......
Aside from the question of the effect to be given to the exceptions
clause in the statute, there is an additional question: when does
the statute of limitations commence to run on the escheat action?
N. D. Rev. Code § 10-0602 (1943) provides that all corporations
which now own or hold rural real estate which was acquired prior
to July 29, 1932, and which is used or usable for farming or agri-
culture, except such as is reasonably necessary in the conduct of
their businesses, shall dispose of the same on or before July 29,
1942.
N. D. Rev. Code § 10-0606 (1943) provides that "In case any
corporation fails, within the time fixed by this chapter, to dispose
of any real estate to which it has acquired title . . . then title to
such real estate shall escheat to the county.., upon an action in-
stituted by the state's attorney . . . ."
N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0117 (1943) provides that an action upon
a statute for a penalty or. forfeiture must be commenced within
three years after the cause of action has accrued. N. D. Rev. Code
§ 28-0120 (1943) provides that an action upon a statute for a
penalty or forfeiture given in whole or in part to any person who
will prosecute for the same must be commenced within the year
by a private party, and if not so commenced, then within two years
thereafter in behalf of the state . . . by the state's attorney of the
county where the offense was committed. N. D. Rev. Code §
28-0122 (1943) provides that an action for relief not otherwise
provided for must be commenced within ten years after the cause
of action shall have accrued.
N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0123 (1943) provides that the limitations
prescribed in Chapter 28-01 shall apply to actions brought in the
name of the state, or for its benefit, in the same manner as to actions
by private parties.
It has been held that a county is amenable to the statutes of
limitation of North Dakota,2" and that an action of escheat. is in the
nature of a forfeiture.
24
About this time you're probably wondering what's happened
to my case with the Attorney General. By informal agreement the
action is in abeyance, with a pending motion by the defense for
23. Rosedale School Dist. No. 5 v. Towner County, 56 N.D. 41, 216 N.W. 212 (1927);
Lakeville Township v. Northwestern Trust Co., 74 N.D. 396, 22 N.W.2d 591 (1946).
24. Black's Law Dictionary 679. See also St. Anthony & Dakota Elevator Co. v.
Martineau, 30 N.D. 425, 153 N.W. 416 (1915);, 53 C.J.S., Limitation of Actions § 89.
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judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations. I
expect the action to remain dormant pending possible action by
the 1961 legislature.
In 1959 Representative Murray Baldwin of Fargo introduced
House Bill 724 in an effort to modify and soften some of the pro-
visions of the present corporate farming act. The bill was introduced
late in the session, somewhat hurriedly, and without adequate
discussion and study before it reached the floor. It consequently
died aborning. The text of the measure is reproduced here:
"A Bill For an Act creating and enacting section 10-0607
of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 authorizing
certain corporations to engage in farming and ranching
operations.
Be it Enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State
of North Dakota:
SECTION 1.) Section 10-0607 of the North Dakota
Revised Code of 1943 is hereby created and enacted to
read as follows:
10-0607. CERTAIN CORPORATIONS EXEMPTED
FROM PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER.)
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as prohibiting
any domestic corporation from owning rural real estate or
carrying on farming or ranching operations, if such
domestic corporation meets the following qualifications:
1. Stockholders shall not exceed ten in number; and
2. The corporation shall not have as a stockholder a
person, other than a trust or estate, who is not a
natural person; and
3. The corporation shall not have as a stockholder any
nonresident alien; and
4. The corporation shall not have more than one class
of stock; and
5. An officer of the corporation shall actively supervise
the farming or ranching operations; and
6. At least eighty percent of, the gross income of the
corporation shall come from farming or ranching
operation."
It will be observed that the provisions of H.B. 724 are patterned
substantially after the'sub-chapter "S" provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code relating to tax option corporations.2 5
25. Int. Rev. Code § 1372 et seq.
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It is the writer's personal belief that this bill or one similar to it
will again be introduced in the 1961 legislature, for a good deal of
pressure for a change in the apparent harsh language of the exist-
ing corporate farming act is being exerted among ranchers in the
western part of the state, and the agriculture committee of the
Greater North Dakota Association has been studying the problem.
Quite likely the time has come when farmers should be given
equal opportunities with other citizens to determine for themselves
the most appropriate type of ownership structure with which to
effectively and economically farm.
